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ABSTRACT 
In the context of sophisticated decision making, the distinct roles played by decision factors are characterized in terms of their behavior in 
affecting the final decision. The evidence that partially matches a factor is considered. Then effective computation rules are presented to 
aggregate the evidence in order. It is argued that a deeper level of causality can be expressed, and that the cognitive structure may be 
better preserved. 
1. Inn-oductlon 
Multi-attribute utility theory ([van Neumann 1947\. [Fishburn 
1970J) has long been an important tool for classical decision 
makings. Together with the rational homo economicu1 model, it 
has received numerous criticisms (e.g. [ Simon 1947J, [Edwards 
1954\, etc) . Indeed, in the reality of subjective decision making, 
individuals as the decision makers can seldom afford to select 
among several alternatives (as in [Tversky 1972J, for instance). 
Instead, a. primarily bivalent conclusion is often needed for the 
particular case under consideration. Besides, very often the rich 
body of causal relations between the factors and the decision is 
lost in the simple, conventional model of faetors weighting (e.g. 
[Fishburn 1967\. [ Yager 1977]). To address these issues, in this 
paper, we shall de-emphasize the aspect of optimal choice in the 
decision, and elaborate the sophisticated process of case analysis 
and evaluations. To this end, the earlier studies of confirmation 
(e.g. [Carnap 1950]) become more relevant in spirit (but not to 
the extent of their appeal to probabilities, for reasons presented 
in the next section.) 
Since we concentrate on the decision making as a process of 
subjective judgement, the burgeoning field of expert systems 
naturally provides many useful insights. In particular, early sys­
tems like MYCIN [Shortliffe 1976[ (which will be frequently 
referred to in the sequel,) and PROSPECTOR [Duda 197\lj have 
explored various relationships between the evidence and the 
hypothesis. Lately, the theoretical works by [Dempster 1967\ 
and [Shafer 1976J that extend probability theories have received 
wide attention for their capability of capturing incomplete and 
uncertain knowledge. (See section 3.) 
Recently, from a different a.ngle, [ Cohen 1983[ has a.rgued that 
the straightforward numerica.l representation �annot discriminate 
kinds of causa.tive situations. Therefore a decision system that 
remains entirely numerical cannot catch the deep meaning of 
factor causality. In part, this argument coincides with our previ­
ous criticism against the conventional factor-weighting mechan­
ism. However, between the two extremes of plain numerical 
calculation and pure symbolic manipulation, (which Cohen's 
work rested on,) we envisage a great deal of latitude for 
improvement; On the one hand, we acknowledge that different 
pieces of evidence do exhibit distinct natures, therefore reck­
lessly massaging them into a single number without regard to 
this heterogeneity is oversimplistic. On the other hand, we also 
regard aggrega.ting different factors as an indispensable capability 
for an intelligent system to reach conclusions. 
It is from this stand that we shall present th is pa per. 
2. Factors and Evidence 
During the process of analysis and judgement, we recognize the 
existence of a subjective tendency in granting the decision. (At 
this moment we content ourselves with the intuitive meaning.) 
In addition, the decision tendency will change as the situation 
presents it.<!elf by means of different factors. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the causal relations are manyfold between the fac-
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tors and the subjective tendency to granting the decision before 
and after acknowledging a factor. In order to describe these rela­
tions, we introduce the following notations: 
H: that the decision maker will make a positive decision 
on the candidate under consideration; 
F is V: a factor F takes the value V; (This factor-value 
association generalizes the bivalent judgement in which 
a piece of fact F=V0 would be either true or false. The 
reason for this generalization is that usually it is not 
only the factor existing or not that counts, but also how 
the factor exists. As a matter of fact, diff e. rent factor 
values can change the way it influences the decision; in 
other words, they may change the role this factor is 
playing. Similar concepts on this many-valued variable 
were formalized in a variable-valued logic calculus VL 1 
for an expert system on soybean disease diagnosis. 
!Michalski 19801) 
Bei(H jE): the prior degree of belief that H should be 
true, given some other knowledge E irrelevant of F. In 
other words, Bei(H jE) expresses the subjective ten­
dency of the decision maker to grant a positive decision; 
(It should be noted that we are not following the Baye­
sian theory, therefore Bel(H�) doesn't obey the usual 
Bayesian rule of conditioning for probabilities: 
Bei(Hn E) 
Bei(E) 
A better interpretation in light of 
Dempster and Shafer's works will be presented in the 
sequel.) 
Bei(H IE,F is V): the posterior degree of belief that H 
should be true, given E and the incremental knowledge 
that F is V; 
It was pointed out earlier that Bei(H IE) should not be equated 
to the conditional probability Prob (HIE) - or just the prior pro­
bability Prob(H) in case of E being trivially true. The major dis­
tinction between Bei(H IE) and Prob(H IE)- assuming the latter 
does cognitively make sense for the moment - is that we require 
Bei(HIE)+Bel(HIE)::=;l in general. This being the case, one 
possible interpretation may be to identify Bel( H IE) with the 
b e/ief function in D empster-Shafer theory. Indeed, some computa­
tional formulae in this paper bear a close relation to their coun­
terparts in D empster-Shafer theory, which will be examined in 
details in section 3. 
2.1 The Role System of Factors 
In this section, all the decision factors will first be categorized 
into different elementary roles (including supportive, adverse, 
sufficient, contrary, and necessary) or their combinations when 
meaningful. These different roles together constitute a role sys-
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tern that sorts out the corpus of human knowledge so that fac­
tors of distinct nature can be treated differently. For each of the 
five elementary roles, we additionally specify an intensity, indicat­
ing how strongly the role may affect the final decision, and two 
margins, signifying the valid range over which the factor would 
play this role. In addition, multiple roles can be played by the 
same factor, in which case the composite effect is amenable to a 
rule of superposition on the elementary roles. 
(1) Supportive Factor 
A supportive factor doesn' t have to be present in order to grant 
a positive decision. In fact, the absence of a purely supportive 
factor should not count against the decision at all. But if the sup­
portive factor does exist, then it should contribute to confirming 
the decision with a degree of support ( the intensity) . 
In analogy to the Measure of increased Belief (MB) in MYCIN, we 
have tried to capture the concept of degree of support ( SU PP) 
by the following equation, with the understanding that Bel(H)!:, 
F is V) is larger than Bel(H�) under the circumstances: 
SUPP Bei(H IE, F is V)-Bei(H jE) 1-Bei(H jE) 
( 1) 
It should be noted that the degree of support is an intuitive con­
cept. When estimated by a decision maker, it reflects in part the 
cognitive structure of this person. It therefore remains charac­
teristic of him only. Another decision maker may very well pro­
vide a different value as the degree of support by the same fac­
tor. Contrary to the possibility that this will introduce an 
undesirable discrepancy from person to person, the variation 
accounts for the individual subjectivity that is intrinsic of a per­
sonal decision making. 
With an estimated degree of support SUPP from the decision 
maker, and with two margins VL and VH ( that form the valid 
value range I VL, VHJ), we then can completely describe the 
behavior of a supportive factor F by the following pair of equa­
tions: 
Bei(H IE, F is VH)=Bei(H IE)+SUPPX(1-Bei(H IE)) 
Bei(H IE, F is Vr)=Bei(H IE) 
(2) 
The distinction between our use of the degree of support SUPP 
and MYCIN's measure of belief MB is now made clear: in 
MYCIN, although MB was defined in terms of prior and poste­
rior probabilities, the system never really attempted to calculate 
them. Instead, ad hoc formulae were invented that only involved 
MB' s themselves. As a result, it doesn' t really make a 
difference how MB was defined. In contrast, the primary con­
cern in this paper is to update the posterior degree of belief 
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using estimated SUPP's and other kinds of role intensities. (It 
should be noted that two later studies in IIshikuza 1981J and 
I Adams 1984] did try to derive MB's based on probabilities and 
Bayes' theorem. However, the former concluded with slightly 
different combination functions.) 
( 2) Adverse Factor 
An adverse factor is a factor which counts against the decision, 
not to the full, but with a degree of adversity (i.e. the intensity). It 
should be pointed out that the absence of an adverse factor sim­
ply means that there is no disconfirmatory effect due to this fac­
tor. This is not to be confused with the presence of a supportive 
factor, in which case the degree of belief in the decision would 
actually be increased. 
Similar to the way SUPP was defined, the degree of adversity 
ADV by factor F can be expressed by the following equation a Ia 
MYCIN, provided that Bel(Hf;, F is V) is known to be smaller 
than Bel(Hf;): 
ADV Bel(H IE)-Bel(H JE, F is V) 
Bel(H JE) (3) 
An interesting observation is in order at this juncture. Although 
the definitions of SUPP and ADV bear a close resemblance to 
the MYCIN definitions of MB and MD (Measure of increased 
Belief) respectively, many properties therein do not hold any 
more. For instance, if we read SUPP(Hf is V) as the degree of 
support for H by F being V, and ADV(Hf is V) as the degree of 
adversity against H by F being V, then it is not true that 
SUPP(H JF is V)=ADV(il jF is V), while in MYCIN we did 
have MB(H,E)=MD(il,E) for any evidence E. The primary 
reason for this difference comes from our requirement that 
Bel( H JE)+Bel( iljE) :S 1 as previously stated. Less mathemati­
cally neat than Prob(H JE)+Prob(HJE)=i as it may appear at 
first, the new formalism is free from a very undesirable conse­
quence in MYCIN: MD(H IE)>O implies MB(H IE)>O; in 
other words, the absence of an adverse factor in MYCIN would 
amount to the presence of a supportive factor! ! Yen 1985J 
In regard to the man-machine interaction, the value of ADV, 
just like the value of SUPP, must also be solicited from the deci­
sion maker. With its degree of adversity determined, an adverse 
factor F can then be completely described in terms of its bear­
ings on the posterior belief as follows: 
Bel(H JE, F is V8)=Bel(H JE)x(1-ADV) 
Bel(H IE, FiB HL)=Bel(H IE) 
(3) Sufflclent Factor 
(4) 
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A sufficient factor is such that its confirmation alone suffices to 
merit an affirmative decision, but no confirming effect will be 
observed if a pure sufficient factor doesn't exist. In practice, the 
degree of sufficiencv (SUFF) may be less than perfect. Therefore 
we may use the following pair of equations to characterize a 
sufficient factor: 
Bei(H IE, FiB V8)==max(Bel(H IE),SUFF) 
Bei(H IE, F iBVL)=Bei(H IE) 
(5) 
Care must be taken here to distinguish a strongly supportive fac­
tor from its sufficient counterpart that is somewhat weak. In 
essence a supportive factor incrementallv adds to the total degree 
of belief, while a sufficient factor ensures the belief to quite a 
considerable degree. The reason for this distinction is that a sup­
portive factor, unlike its sufficient counterpart entailing by itself 
all the information that is needed, usually is intended to corro­
borate with other supportive factors. This need and capability for 
corroboration remains characteristic of all the supportive factors, 
even if a particular supportive factor is so strong that it corro­
borates to yield a very high degree of belief as a single sufficient 
factor would. Since rarely is there no need for corroborative con­
siderations, the supportive role is generally preferred. 
( 4) Necessary Factor 
The factor has to be present in order to make a positive decision. 
If the factor is absent, however, the belief in the decision will be 
reduced to nil. On the other hand, the confirmation of a pure 
necessary factor does not contribute to a larger degree of belief 
at all. 
In practice, we shall describe the behavior of a necessary factor 
by means of its degree of neceBsity NEC defined as: 
NEC=i-Bei(H IE, F i8 VL). Note that Bel(H IE,F i8 VL) 
generalizes the classical notation Prob (HIE}') and should be 
close to 0. Now that an estimated degree of necessity is given 
by the decision maker, we are then in a position to describe a 
necessary factor F as follows: (Remember that Fill V8 general­
izes FiB present , and F is VL generalizes F i8 absent (F).) 
Bel(H IE, F i8 VH)=Bei(H JE) (6) 
Bei(H IE, F is VL)==min(Bel(H IE), I- NEG) 
( li) 0Jnttary Faetor 
If a contrary factor is present, the degree of belief in the positive 
decision will be excluded. However, the absence of such a factor 
doesn't lead to an increased belief. Thus, a contrary factor in a 
sense is the negation of a necessary factor. 
··similar to the degree of necessity, we can define a degree of con­
traries CONTR as: CO NTR=l-Bei(H \E,F is VH), which will 
be again solicited from the decision maker. Then the contrary 
factor will act up to the following pair of equations: 
Bei(H IE, F is VH)=min(Bei(H IE), 1- CONTR) 
Bei(H IE, F is VL)=Bei(H IE) 
(7) 
Although the same factor can play multiple roles, it should be 
noted that an intuitive rule of superposition precludes any con­
tradictory combination. For example, it is not allowed to have 
the same factor be both supportive and adverse. But a supportive 
role can certainly be combined with a necessary role. 
2.2 Combination of Factors 
In the previous section, we have studied the individual behaviors 
of different kinds of roles for a factor; we have also remarked 
that multiple roles can be played by the same factor within the 
realm of logical consistency. However, the issue of the joint 
behavior by multiple factors was not addressed. Since very rarely 
would there be a single-factor decision situation - even if the fac­
tor consists of compound statements, the study of the issue in 
this section thus becomes imperative. 
( 1) Multiple Supportive Factors 
Suppose we have two supportive factors F1 and F2 respectively 
defined as follows: 
Bei(H IE, F1 is VH )=Bei(H \E)+S1X(I-Bei(H IE)) 
I 
Bei(H \E, F1 is VL )=Bei(H IE) 
I 
Bei(H IE, F2 is VH )=Bei(H IE)+S2X(l-Bei(H IE)) 2 
Bei(H IE, F2 is VL )=Bei(H IE) 2 
(8) 
(9) 
Our interest is to calculate the joint posterior degree of h elief, for­
mally Bei(H IE, F1 is VH , F2 is VH ). If we recall the meaning 
I 2 
of Bei(H IE), this is easily answered by substituting 
Bei(H IE, F1 is VH) for Bei(H IE) in equation (9). After rear­
! 
rangement, we obtain the following pair of equations for the 
joint belief: 
=Bei(H IE)+(S1+S2-S1XS2) X(l-Bei(H IE) 
Bei(H IE, F1 is VL , F2 is VL )=Bei(H IE) 
I 2 
(10) 
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It is interesting to observe that the joint degree of support SUPP 
obeys the following relation with the two constituent degrees of 
support S1 and S2: 
( 11) 
Not surprisingly, this combination method bears exactly the 
same functional form as the combined measures of belief in 
MYCIN. However, because our derivation is based on the 
increased belief resulting from a factor valuation, we are able to 
perform partiol matchings against available evidence, as will be 
examined in the next section. Finally, we shall just briefly 
remark that the sequence in combining multiple supportive fac­
tors does not affect the final posterior belief, due to the fact that 
the combination formula is both commutative and associative. 
{2) Multiple Adverse Factors 
Similar to the case with multiple supportive factors, suppose we 
have two adverse factors F1 and F2 defined by: 
Bei(H IE, F1 is VH1)=Bei(H IE) X(l-AtJ 
Bei(H IE, F1 is VL )=Bei(H IE) 
I 
Bei(H IE, Fz is VH )=Bei(H IE) X{l-A2) 2 
( 12) 
(13) 
The question here is again to ask the value of the joint posterior 
degree of belief Bei(H IE, F1 is VH1, F2 is VH2). By substitut-
ing Bei(H IE, F1 is VH ) in equation (12) for Bei(H'fJ} in ( 13), 
1 
we easily derive the following relations: 
=Bei(H IE)X(l-A1)X{l-A2) 
Bei(H /E, F1 is VL , F2 is VL )=Bel(H IE) 
I 2 
( 14) 
Just like the joint degree of support in the previous case, from 
(14) we can also derive a joint degree of adversity ADV in terms 
of A1 and A2 such that 
Bel(H IE, F1 is VH , F2 is VH )=Bei(H IE) X(l- ADV): (There-
! 2 
fore although our SUPP and ADV Jack the same symmetry with 
respect to H as in MB and MD, we still enjoy a.n identical combi­
nation method between SUPP's and ADV's respectively, hence 
the combination sequence for adverse factors is also commuta­
tive and associative.) 
I 
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( 15) 
(3) Supportive Faeton ln ChnJunctlon with Adverse Factms 
Consider the scenario in which both a supportive factor and an 
adverse factor come into play. In other words, suppose we have 
equations (8) and (13) both being effective for the decision 
maker, with factor F1 being supportive and factor F2 adverse, 
then what is the joint degree of belief 
Bel(H IE, F1 i8 VH , F2 i8 VH ) in this caaeT 1 2 
At this juncture it seems that we are entitled to two alternatives 
for deriving the joint belief: in the first approach we substitute 
Bel(H IE, F1 i8 VH) for Bel(H �) in equation (13), in which 
1 
case the supportive factor will be dilcounted by the adverse factor 
(Remember that equation (13) relates to the adverse factor F2). 
In the second approach, however, we substitute 
Bel(H IE, F2 il VH ) for Bel(H m in equation (8). in which caae 2 
we shall have the adverse factor leBitened by its supportive coun­
terpart. Unfortunately, the two methods will yield different 
results, and it can be eaaily shown that the first method alwaJIB 
leads to a more conservative (smaller) degree of belief. So, 
which is the one to chooseT 
It turns out that the first method - supportive factors discounted 
by adverse ones - is better for the following two reaaons. First, it 
always incorporates both the supportive and the adverse effects 
in the calculation, regardless of the initial value of Bel(Hf.:) . In 
contraat, the second method will suppress the adverse effect in 
caae of the initial Bel(H �) being 0, this is because we substitute 
Bei(H IE, F2 i1 VH/�el(H IE):x{l-A.2)� for Bel(H f.:) in 
equation ( 8). Second, by using D empster-Shafer theory with 
appropriate interpretations it is possible to derive the same result 
aa in the first method. ( Our attempt to rel&te to that theory is 
covered in section 4.) 
As a result, we shall adopt the first method to derive the joint 
degree of belief as follows: 
=9Bel(H IE)+S1x(1-Bel(H IE)I ><(1-..A.ll) 
Bel(H IE, F1 il VL , F2 il VL )�el(H IE) 1 2 
( 16) 
Contrary to the previous cases with multiple supportive or 
adverse factors, in which the joint degree of support/adversity 
can be expressed in terms of respective components as in ( 11) 
and (15), there i,s no simple counterpart here - neither a joint 
degree of support or a joint. degree of adversity is com posable 
without involving the Bel(H �) terms. This observation confirms 
a common criticism that the MYCIN formula for Certainty Fac-
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tors CF=MB-MD when combining confirmatory and 
disconflrmatory evidence is truly an &d hoc device. In addition, 
the same argument also applies to the EMYCIN revision [ V&n 
Melle 1980], which is CF 1_ ,!��:�D) · 
( t) Muldple Suftlelent, Necesse:ry , or Contrary Factors 
Because of the nonaggregalive nature, as mentioned earlier, in 
these three kinds of factors, the combination of their instances is 
therefore different from that of supportive or adverse factors. To 
start with, let us consider the situation where there are two 
sufficient factors F1 and F2, with respective degrees of 
sufficiency SUFF1 and SUFF2• Then the joint degree of belief 
may be established by the factor with a larger degree of 
sufficiency. Stated mathematically, with the notation 
SUFFMAx=maz(SUFF11SUFF2), we shall have 
Similarly, the joint degree of belief.for two necessary factors may 
be defined as 
( 18) 
Bel(H IE, F1 ill VL , F2 i8 VL )=min(Bel(H IE),l-NECMAX) 1 2 
where NECMAX=maz(NE01,NEC2); by the same token, two 
contrary factors should act upon the joint belief according to the 
following pah of equations: 
=min(Bel(H IE),1- OONTRMAX) 
Bel(H IE, F1 i8 VL , F2 ill VL )�el(H IE) I 2 
( 6) The Overall Comlinatlon 
( 19) 
We have studied severa.l combinations between different factors, 
but we still have to determine the overall combining sequence 
that includes the entirety of decision factors. From previous dis­
cussions, it is n&tural to propose a sequence such that all suppor­
tive fa.ctors will be combined first, followed by successive 
discounts from the adverse factors. Finally the total degree of 
belief is either guaranteed by sufficient factors, or nullified by 
contrary factors, or else filtered by the necessary ones. 
2.3 Partial Matching ll)' Evidence 
In previous sections we have presented a role system for factors 
considered to be relevant by the decision maker. Although 
different roles assume different behaviors, it is common to all of 
them that the factor (as the role player) represents only a gen­
eric expectation beforehand. As the time comes when actually in 
the decision process, the judgement made on each factor really 
depends on the particular evidence obtained; whether done reli­
ably or by virtue of guesses, the "evidence" will be used to 
match against the corresponding factor. 
This factor/evidence dichotomy can also be viewed as patterns 
versus data (in the terminology of pattern matching), or decision 
variables versus their values (in the classical theo�y). At any 
rate, the point is that the matching may not be perfect, therefore 
the asserted rule of behavior (i.e. the paired equations) may not 
apply to the whole. Then it is really up to the decision maker to 
determine the effectiveness of the original rule. If the person 
performs a bivalent, all-or-none matching (which we shall call a 
rigid judgement), then all the evidence that falls short of expecta­
tion will amount to nothing, no matter how small the margin is. 
Alternatively, the decision maker can release the rigorous con­
straint and employs an elastic judgement, in which case the rule of 
behavior will be partia/111 observed on imperfect evidence. In this 
paper, we assume that all the judgements are elastic. This is 
purely for the convenience of discussion. 
Suppose a particular piece of evidence shows that F is VE in the 
range of factor values I VL, VH ]. As a result several cases may 
arise in light of the theory of measurement (e.g. ]Krantz 1971]). 
The factor values may be in nominal or ordinal scale, in which 
case it would be difficult to reason the behavior of F is VE, 
short of equations for F at values other than VL or VH. How­
ever, if the factor values are at least in interval scale, then it 
makes more sense to measure how closely the evidence is 
present to the full degree. This measurement, which will be 
referred to as the evidential strength 71, may be defined by the fol­
lowing ratio: 
(20) 
(Therefore the definition of this evidential strength does general­
ize the rigid judgement to be more than a matter of 
absence/presence.) Now that we have computed 71 from the evi­
dence (which we shall write as F is VE), we are facilitated to 
reason the new rule of behavior for factor F under various cir­
cumstances. For instance, ifF is a supportive factor the posterior 
belief Bel(H�, F is V sub E ) can be estimated by a linear inter­
polation between the two equations in (2): 
Bei(H \E, F is VE)=Bei(H \E)+SUPPX71 X(1- Bei(H \E)) (21) 
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It should be noted here that the linear interpolation has been 
chosen mainly for its simplicity; actually other methods are also 
applicable. In particular, if we replace 71 by 71 n with a big n in 
the estimating equation (21), we are effectively simulating a rigid 
judgement. In fact this raise-to-powers method has been widely 
used in I Zadeh 1978a] and other related works to deal with vari­
ous degrees of stringency in semantics. 
In the case when F is an adverse factor evidenced with strength 
71, a linear interpolation between equations ( 4) would yield: 
Bei(H \E, F is VE)=Bei(H \E)X(l-ADVX71) (22) 
When it comes to sufficient factors, a linear interpolation should 
be taken between Bel(H�) and SUFF in the first equation of 
( 5). The result then becomes 
Bei(H \E, F is VE) (23) 
=maz(Bei(H \E), (l-71)xBei(H \E)+71 XSUFF) 
Suppose F is a necessary factor, then a linear interpolation in 
equations (6) gives us the following estimation: 
Bei(H \E, F is VE) (24) 
=min(Bei(H \E), TfxBei(H \E)+(l-71)X(l-NEC)) 
Finally, in the case ofF being a contrary factor with strength Tf, 
we may obtain the following interpolated belief from {7): 
Bei(H \E, F is VE) {25) 
=min(Bei(H \E), (l-Tf)xBei(H \E)+71X{l- CO NTR)) 
2.4 Aggregation of Evidence 
In the previous section we have made a distinction between the 
factor and the evidence, accordingly the rules of the factor 
behavior were in essence discounted in proportion to the avail­
able evidential strengths. Note that the rule discount may be 
elastic to various degrees. This elasticity can be achieved by 
choosing the power term for interpolation. However, we shall 
confine ourselves to the linear case in this paper. 
In mc·re general settings, just as the decision maker needs to 
combine multiple factors specified, he often has to aggregate 
pieces of evidence collected. It is this issue that we now turn to. 
Consider two pieces of evidence E1: F1 is VE1 and 
E2: F2 is VE2, with corresponding evidential strengths 71 and � 
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defined by: 11 
estimate the aggregated degree of 6 elief due to the two pieces of 
evidence, formally written a.s Bei(H IE, F1 u VEl' F2 il VE2), 
and we shall examine various cases in which F1 and F2 assumes 
various roles. To begin with, let us suppose they both are sup­
portive factors, with respective degrees of support S 1 and S2, 
then an inspection into equations (10), (11), and (2 1) will lead 
to the following equation: 
(26) 
=Bel(H IE)+SUPPx{l- Bei(H IE)) 
with the aggregated degree of 1upport SUPP equa.I to 
S111+S2�-S111 XS2�. 
As a possible generalization, we can redefine this SUPP to be 
S1+S2-S1S2x('1*d, where the two-place function '1*� is such 
that (1) 11*� *1'/, (2) ('1*d*€==q*(�*€), (3) if 11'S� and ll'SV, 
then 11 *ll'S�•v, a.nd (4) 1*1'/==q . Then the question of 
appropriate function forms for 11 *� arises. It turns out that such 
11 *I has been widely studied in a.rell.!l related to the fuzzy set 
theory, and is formally named a triangular form. The class of 
these triangular forms can take a variety of actual function 
forms, most notably maz(O, 11+�-1), I'/ X�, and min(11, d, in an 
increasing order ]Prade Hl85]. Other parametric function forms 
of the cla.ss can be found in, e.g. ]Dombi 1982). For the pur­
pose of illustration here, we shall refer to the one by Ho.ma.cher: 
'1*� >-+(1->.)�x:H-1'/Xd (O<S>-.'S
1). Notice tha.t the 11*� 
above reduces to a simple product 11 X�, which is its maximum 
for all possible >-'•, in the special ca.se of >.==I. Therefore by care­
fully adjusting the value of >., we can control the product term 
S1S2X{11*d in the aggregated degree of support SUPP, which 
really accounts for the interaction between the two pieces of evi­
dence. It is for this reason that we regard ). as a correlation indi­
cator. 
Similar result may be obtained when factors F1 and F2 are both 
adverse, since as observed earlier from equation ( 14}. the joint 
degree of adversity employs the same combination formula as 
the joint degree of support. More specifically, with aid of equa­
tions (14) and (22), we shall ha.ve 
(27) 
where ADV is defined a.s A1 11+A2�-A1A2><{11•�), with the 
understanding that 11 *� generalizes the straightforward product 
term 11 X�. 
Now suppose factor F1 is supportive, and F2 is adverse. To com-
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pute the aggregated posterior belief 
Bei(H IE, F1 is VE , F2 il VE ), we simply dissolve equations 1 2 
(21) and (22) into (16), then we shall obtain the following rela­
tion: 
(28) 
=jBei(H IE)+S1'1><{1-Bei(H IE)j x(1-A2d 
When it comes to two sufficient factors, with their nature being 
nonaggregative, the "aggregated" belief is then establi:Jhed by 
simply taking the maximum of the two interpolations. Stated 
symbolically, we have a relation very similar to (17): 
Bei(H IE, F1 is VE, F2 is VE )=maz(Bei(H IE),SUFFM,u)(29) 
I 2 
The only change is that SUFFMAX now becomes 
maz( (1- 11) xBei(H IE)+'1 xSUFF1, (1-1) xBei(H IE)+\"XSUFF2 ). 
By the same token, if both factors F1 and F2 are necessary , we 
shall have the counterpart of ( 18): 
(30) 
=min(Bei(H IE),1- NECMAX) 
with NECMAX==l- min( 11 xBei(H IE)+(1- 11) X(1- NEC1), 
�xBei(H jE)+(1- �)x(1- NEC2) ). To better understand the 
meaning of the aggregated degree of neceBMlJI NECM,U here, it is 
illuminating to study two special ca.ses: (1) 11�=0: this amounts 
to both factors being absent to the full. In this case NECMAX is 
just the maxim urn or the two degrees or necessity. ( 2) 11 ==l but 
0<1<1: this is the situation in which the decision maker will 
conclude that factor F1 is completely fulfilled, but factor F2 is 
somewhat absent. In other words, the decision maker can 
neglect the first factor and focuses on the partial evidential 
matching with the second. Indeed, simple algebraic operations 
would reduce equation (30) to the partial matching relation (24) 
for factor F2. Very similar results can be derived for two con­
trary factors: 
Bei(H jE, F1 is VE, F2 is VE) 1 2 
=min(Bei(H IE),1- CONTRMAX) 
(31) 
with CONTRMAX==l- min( ( 1- 11) ><Bel( H IE)+'1 x( 1- CONTR 1) , 
(1-dxBei(H IE)+Ix(1- CONTR2) ). 
As an ending remark in this section, the seque nee in which we 
aggregate all pieces of evidence should be identical to the 
sequence in which all factors were combined. 
3. A View from Dempster-Shafer Theory 
In the beginning of section 2, we related Bei(H IE) to the belief 
function in D empster-Shafer theory. In this section, we shall 
examine the relation more comprehensively. 
The major advantage of the D empster-Shafer theory, as stated in 
[ Gordon 1984[, is ''its ability to model the narrowing of the 
hypothesis set with the accumulation of evidence" in application 
to the diagnostic reasoning. Our purpose, being a bivalent deci­
sion making, we shall mainly benefit from a conse:juence of its 
generality. Specifically, the theory affords us to avoid the Baye­
sian restriction that the commitment of belief to a particular 
decision implies the commitment of the rest of belief to its nega­
tion; i.e. that Prob(H [E)=1-Prob(H[E). 
To facilitate a partial interpretation of our model in view of the 
D empster-Shafer theory, we shall first refer to some related con­
cepts in that theory, then try to compare our model with them. 
It should be noted here that a familiarity with the theory itself is 
assumed, and that the concept mentions in the sequel are pri­
marily meant to unify the notations before relating to our 
works. 
Let us start with the frame of discernment 9, which, in our case, 
contains H and H only. Then the basic probability assignment 
(bpa) m will be such that m(H)+ m( ll)+m(9) =l.. Further­
more, over H and H we shall have belief function�� B(H) and 
B(H), which, as a special case in our situation, are identical to 
m(H) and m(ll) respectively. (Although the whole issue of 
belief versus plausibility is of fundamental importance in the 
theory, it is not essential for our purpose of interpretation and 
therefore will not be addressed here.) 
Let B 1 and B2 denote two belief functions based on their bpa's 
m1 and m2 respectively. D empster's rule of combination will 
then calculate the combined effect of m1 and m2, which is 
denoted by mpm2. Based on this result, a combined belief 
function BpB2 can be trivially obtained in our case. (Since the 
beliefs and the bpa's will take the same value over the singletons 
H and H.) In [ Gordon 1984], several special cases in connection 
to MYCIN have been studied for the combined belief. For the 
purpose of reference in the sequel, we now rephrase two of them 
as follows: 
Suppose B1(H)� and B2(H)=z0, (In other words, both 
beliefs support H only.) then the combined belief 
BPB2 according to Dempster's rule will be such that 
BPB2(H)=E1(H)+B2(H)x(l-B1(H)) (32) 
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On the other hand, if B1(ll)� and B2(H)=z0, which 
means the first belief supports H while the second sup­
ports ll, then the combined belief BPB2 becomes 
(33) 
It should be mentioned here that the sole purpose of 
the multiplication by 
1 is to obtain a 
1-B1(H) XB2(H) 
normalized bpa. Therefore the multiplier will be referred 
to as the normalization factor. 
We are now in a position to relate our formalism to these con­
cepts. As mentioned earlier, we may identify our degree of belief 
Be/(H [E) with Dempster-Shafer's belief function B(H). 
(Equivalently m(H), for that matter.) In order to emphasize 
that B(ll) has been obtained from the knowledge E, we shall 
rewrite it as BE( H). Similarly, Bei(H IF is VH) can be written as 
BF(H), with the understanding that the factor F exists to the 
whole by taking its value at VH· Finally, our joint degree of 
belief, namely Bei(H [E, F is VH), can be regarded as the com­
bined belief, in the sense of D empster's rule, from the two com­
ponent beliefs Bei(H [E) and Bel(H I F is VH)· Stated simply, 
we shall equate Bei(H [E, F is VH) with BJ!JBF(H) in this sec­
tion. Now that the two body of concepts have been interpreted 
as above, we are then ready to show that our combination 
method for multiple supportive factors is consistent with the 
Dempster-Shafer result. Moreover, we shall show that our com­
bination of adverse factors, or that between supportive and 
adverse factors, corresponds to an unnormalized De mpter's for­
mula. 
In the first place, let us demonstrate that under an additional 
assumption the Dempster's equation in (32) can be used to 
derive our formula in (10) for combining two supportive factors. 
To this end, the assumption we have to make is that the degree 
of support (SUPP) by the factor Fin our equation (2) can be 
equated to the belief BF(H) in Dempster-Shafer's terms. As a 
result of this equality, with the interpretations we made earlier, 
the upper equations in (8) and (9) may be rewritten as 
Bi:JBF (H)=BE(H)+BF (H)X(l-BE(H)) 2 2 
(34) 
(35) 
(which exactly re-formulate the Dempster's  equation in (32)). 
The next step is to recognize that our joint belief 
Bei(H IE, F is VH , F is VH ) is actually BJP[BFOBF J(H). 1 2 1 2 
To compute it, we can make use of the associativity in the gen­
eral Dempster's rule, (which can also been seen from (32) itself) 
and replace BE(H) in (35) by Bi:JBF (H) of (34). Recalling 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
that this substitution process is exactly the way we have derived 
the upper equation in ( 10), we therefore have completed the 
proof. 
Before turning to cues involving adverse factors, it is useful to 
remark that the normalization factor in (33) can lead to counter­
intuitive results, aa haa been pointed out by [ Zadeh 1Q7Q]. In 
fact, as mentioned earlier, our model corresponds to a.n unnor­
malized form of (33); that is, B{)B2(H)=B1(H)x{1-B2(/l)). 
To establish this correspondence, we have to make the following 
assumption that, the degree of adversity (ADV) by the factor F 
in our equation (4) equals the disbelief BF(/l) in Dempster­
Shafer's terms. This being the case, our combining formulae in 
( 12) and ( 13) for adverse factors can be seen to become 
instances of an unnormalized equation (33). Then our joint pos­
terior belief in two adverse factors, which has been equated to 
Bif)[BFOBF ](H), can be obtained by the same substitution 
l 2 
process between ( 12) and (13) as in the case of supportive fac­
tors. (This is all because of the associativity of Demspter's rule.) 
As a result, the counterpart of our combining formula in ( 14) is 
derived: 
B£)[BFPBF2[(H)=BE(H) x{1-BF1
(1l)) ><{ 1- BFpl)), which 
is wha.t we have claimed. By the same token, the case in which 
supportive factors are combined with adverse factors can also be 
established to validate our formula in ( 16). 
To conclude this section, we note that, although a correspon­
dence exists between Dempster-Shafer's result and our model 
on the supportive and the adverse factors, the correspondence is 
certainly not a comprehensive one. Beside the fact that some 
additional assumptions were made in the process of argument, it 
is apparent that the concept of factor margins and that of partial 
matching extends beyond their framework. In a nutshell, this is 
because what was addressed there is the issue of combination of 
beliefs in the realm of hypotheses, not the issue of relations 
between factors and decisions. (This explains in part the reasons 
for not adapting their theory in the beginning, let alone the rest 
of classes of roles.) 
4. Concluding Remark 
In review of what we have presented in the context of subjective 
decision making, we started with a role classification system for 
all the decision factors. Each role of the factor has two margin 
values and an intensity to cast its peculiar influence on the final 
degree of belief. Then co.mbinations between factors were stu­
died. Based on the evidence/factor dichotomy, we embodied the 
concept of partial matching in the belief system and went on to 
derive corresponding equations for evidential aggregation. 
Finally, we took certain interpretations and demonstrated the 
similarity to, and the distinction from Dempster-Shafer theory in 
special cases. Notwithstanding the apparant resemblance, it then 
became clear that the theory really addresses different issues 
than ours. 
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It should be noted that the entirety of our belief system may 
very well have been presented without change under the frame­
work of /uzztrseHheoretic possibilit11 theories ( e.g. [ Zadeh Hl65J, 
[ Zadeh 1Q78b] ). To adapt the formalism to the new setting, we 
should regard Bei(H [E) as the possibility that the decision 
maker, with all the evidence E, will grant a positive decision on 
the case being considered. Note that the concept of possibility is 
different from that of the probability. ( It expresses the eaae of 
attainment as a. ma.tter of degree.) This observation manefests 
the general applicability of the role system. 
In practiccal use, however, we expect that difficulties may arise 
for the decision maker. Especially when asked to give subjec­
tive opinions in terms of precise numb era on how a factor (with 
its intensity and two margins) would influence the decision. For­
tunately, this problem can be circumvented by employing 
linguistic descriptions [ Zadeh 1975[. A number of empirical stu­
dies ( e.g. [ Freksa 1982]) have clearly spelled out the merits of 
such a linguistic, rather than numerical approach. Again, the 
extension to these fuzzy-set-based linguistic terms doesn't 
change the resulting formulae in our belief system. 
To conclude, the rich semantics of the role system along with 
the computational belief mechanisms provide us with a deeper 
level of expression for factor causality. The versatile implications 
by kinds of evidence can now be drawn more naturally than 
using classical decision theories. Thus the integrity of a decision 
maker's cognitive structure may be better preserved, meriting 
the system a more realistic mentality. 
Acknowledgement 
The a.uthor is indebted to Professor Zadeh for his continuous 
encouragement. Recent discussions with .hhn Yen ha.ve greatly 
benefited the research. The author also thanks Dr. Chris Talbot 
and Dr. Malcolm Slaney at Schlumberger for their prompt help 
in preparing the paper. 
Rererence 
[ Adams 1Q84J Adams, J.B., "Probabilistic Reaaoning and Cer­
tainty Factors," Rule-Based Expert S118letr111 (Buchanan, B. and 
Shortliffe, E., eds.) . Menlo-Park: Addison-Wesley, pp. 263-271, 
1Q84. 
[ Carnap 1Q60] Carnap, R., "The Two Concepts of Probability," 
Logical Foundations of Probabilit11. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, pp. 1Q-61, 1Q60. 
[ Cohen 1Q83[ Cohen, P., Heumtic R easoning about Uncerlainl11: 
An Arlificia l Int elligence Approach, PhD dissertation, Dept. of 
Computer Science, Stanford University, 1983. 
[ Dempster 1967] D empster, A.P., "U pper and L ower Probabili­
ties Induced by a Multivalued Mapping," Ann. Math. Statist., Vol. 
38 ( 1967) ' pp. 325-329. 
[ Dombi 11l82] D ombi, J., "A General Class of Fuzzy Opera­
tions," Fuzzy Sets and SysterM, Vol. 8 ( 1982), pp. 149-163. 
[ D uda 1979) D u da, R.O., Hart, P.E., Konolige, K., and Reboh, 
R, A Computer-Based Concultant for Mineral exploration, SRI 
Report, Sept., 1979. 
[ Edwards 1954] Edwards, W., "The Theory of Decision Mak­
ing," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1954), pp. 380-417. 
[Fishburn 1970] Fishburn, P.C., Utility Th eory and D ecision Mak­
ing. New York: John Wiley, lll70. 
[Fishburn 1967] Fishburn, P.C., "Methods of Estimating Addi­
tive U tilities," Management Sci., Vol. 13 (lll67), pp. 435-453. 
[Freksa 11l82] Freksa, C., "Linguistic D escription of Human 
Judgements in Expert Systems and in the ' Soft' Sciences," 
Approximate R easoning in D ecision Analysis (M. M. Gupta and E. 
Sanchez, eds.). New York: North-Holland, pp. 297-305, 1982. 
[ Ishizuka 1981] Ishizuka, M., Fu, K.S., and Yao, J.P.T., "A 
Theoretical Treatment of Certainty Factor in Production Sys­
tems," Memo CE-SIR-81-6, Purdue U niv ., lll81. 
[ Gordon 1984] Gorden, J., and S hortliffe, E., "The D empster­
Shafer Theory of Evidence, " Rule-Based Expert SysterM 
(Buchanan, B. and Shortliffe, E., eds.) . Menlo-Park: Addison­
Wesley, pp. 272-292, 1984. 
[ Krantz 1971] Krantz, D.H., Luce R.D., and Tversky, A., Foun­
dations of Measurement, Vol. 1. New York: Academic Press, lll71. 
[ Michalski 11l80J Michalski, R.S., and Chilausky, R.L., "Learn­
ing by Being Told and Learning from Examples: An Experimen­
tal Comparison of the Two Methods of Knowledge Acquisition 
in the Context of D eveloping an Expert System for Soybean 
D is ease D iagnosis," Int. J. Policy Analysis and Information Systems, 
Vol. 4, No. 2(June 11l80), pp. 125-161. 
[Prade 1985] Prade, H., "A Computational Approach to Approx­
imate and Plausible Reasoning with Applications to Expert Sys­
tems," IEEE Trans. Pattern_Analysis and Machine Intelligence, Vol. 
7, No. 3(May, 1985),  pp. 260-283. 
[ Simon 11l47] Simon, H.A., Administrative Behavior. New York: 
Macmillan, 197. 
[ Shafer 11l76] Shafer, G., A Ma thematical Theory of Evidence. 
Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1976. 
282 
[ Shortliffe 1976] Shortliffe, E.H., Computer Based Medical Consul­
tations: MYCIN. New York: American Elsevier, lll76. 
[Tversky 1972] Tversky, A., "Eliminatation by Aspects: A 
Theory of Choice," Psychology R eview (197\l),  pp. 281-299. 
[ van Melle 1980] van Melle, W., A D o main Independent System 
that Aids in Constructing Knowledge Based Consultation Programs, 
PhD dissertation, D ept. of Computer Science, Stanford U niv ., 
1980. 
[ von Neumann 1947] van Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, 0., 
Theory of Games and Eco nomic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton 
U niversity Press, 11l47. 
[Yager 1977] Yager, R.R., " Multiple Objective D ecision-Making 
U sing Fuzzy Sets," Int. J. Man-Machine Studies, Vol. 9 (1977), 
pp. 375-382. 
[Yen 1985] Yen, John, p rivate communications, Dept. of EECS, 
U .C. Berkeley, April, 1985. 
[ Zadeh 1965] Zadeh, L.A., "Fuzzy Sets," Informal. and Control 
(June 1965), pp. 338-353. 
[ Zadeh 1975] Zadeh, L.A., "The Concept of a Linguistic Vari­
able and Its Application to Approximate Reasoning. Part I, " 
Information Sci., Vol. 8 (1975), pp. 199-249;
. 
Part II, Information 
Sci., Vol. 8 (1975), pp301-357; Part III, Information Sci., Vol. 9 
(1975), pp43-80. 
[ Zadeh 1978a] Zadeh, L .A., "PRUF--a Meaning Representation 
Language for Natural Languages," Int. J. Man-Machine Studies, 
Vol. 10( 1977) , pp. 395-460. 
[ Zadeh 1978b) Zadeh, L.A., "Fuzzy Sets as a Basis for a Theory 
of Possibility, " Fuzzy Sets and SysterM, Vol. 1 (1978) , pp. 395-460. 
[ Zadeh 1979] Zadeh, L .A., "On the Validity of D empster' s Rule 
of Combination of Evidence," Memo M79/24, Electronics 
Research Lab., U .C. Berkeley, 1979. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I· 
I 
